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Tyler Paytas
1. iNtroductioN
Over the course of the past several decades, Kant scholars have made 
significant headway in showing that emotions play a more significant role 
in Kant’s ethics than has traditionally been assumed. Closer attention 
has been paid to the Metaphysics of Morals (MS)1 where Kant provides 
important insights about the value of moral sentiments and the role they 
should play in our lives. One particularly important discussion occurs in 
sections 34 and 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue where Kant claims we have 
a duty to use sympathetic feelings “as a means of promoting active and 
rational benevolence” (MS 6:457). Kant labels this the “duty of human-
ity,” and he suggests that nature has implanted sympathetic feelings in 
us “to do what the representation of duty alone might not accomplish” 
(ibid.). Commentators have rightly highlighted these remarks as prime 
evidence that feelings do play a positive role in Kant’s ethics after all.
 Yet, while we know that feelings such as sympathy have a role to play 
in Kant’s ethics, it is not obvious exactly what this role is or in what 
the value of sympathy consists. Two different views on this issue have 
emerged in the literature. According to what we can call the motivational 
account, we have a duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings because we 
sometimes need them to be motivated to perform beneficent actions. On 
another popular interpretation, sympathy is valued for the epistemic 
role it plays in helping us fulfill duties of beneficence. The suggestion 
is that we have a duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings because they 
alert us to the suffering of others, and they allow us to recognize more 
easily the sort of help that is needed. Call this the epistemic account.2
 What these views share in common is that they focus primarily on 
the psychology of moral agents. As a moral agent, I have a duty to cul-
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tivate sympathy because, without it, I might either fail to be motivated 
to help or lack important knowledge of when and how to help. Although 
there are reasonable grounds for holding either view, both are subject 
to considerable worries. In brief, while the motivational account seem-
ingly runs counter to Kant’s views about autonomy and purity of will, 
the epistemic account either rests on a faulty conception of sympathetic 
feelings, or it too stands in tension with central Kantian doctrines. Fur-
ther, even if the tension between these accounts and other aspects of 
Kant’s ethics can be resolved, neither view explains why sympathy is 
important even for agents who are otherwise fully virtuous—something 
we should expect to be accounted for by an ethical theory.
 In light of these concerns, I believe that, in order to understand fully 
the Kantian value of sympathy, we must shift our focus away from the 
psychology of moral agents and toward the emotional needs of moral 
patients. In this paper, I argue that the Kantian duty to cultivate and 
use sympathetic feelings is grounded (at least partly) in the fact that 
receiving expressions of sympathy from others is an important human 
need. Due to our animal nature, conduct motivated by duty alone will 
not always be effective in promoting the happiness of others. This is 
because physical and financial assistance (which do not require feelings) 
are often insufficient for relieving human suffering. It is part of human 
nature to need an emotional connection with others—especially during 
periods of grief, loneliness, and depression. Thus, even if moral agents 
never need sympathetic feelings to be motivated to try to help others, 
sympathetic feelings are often necessary for succeeding in our attempts 
to help.
 The discussion proceeds as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I explicate 
the two traditional accounts of the Kantian value of sympathy, and I 
argue that neither view is sufficiently compelling. Then, in section 4, I 
put forth what I call the patient-centered account of the Kantian value of 
sympathy. I provide textual evidence in support of the view, and I explain 
the advantages it has over rival accounts. In section 5, I suggest that the 
patient-centered account has the further merit of solving an interpretive 
puzzle arising from Kant’s discussion of the “four moral endowments” 
in his introduction to the Doctrine of Virtue. A brief conclusion follows.
2. the motivAtioNAl AccouNt
In Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Doctrine of the Elements of Ethics, Kant 
distinguishes three different duties of love: beneficence, gratitude, and 
sympathy. In section 34, he provides a lengthy exposition of the duty of 
sympathy. Under the heading Sympathetic feeling is generally a duty, 
Kant writes,
s__
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Sympathetic joy and sadness (sympathia moralis) are sensible feelings 
of pleasure or displeasure (which are therefore to be called “aesthetic”) 
at another’s state of joy or pain (shared feeling, sympathetic feeling). 
Nature has already implanted in human beings receptivity to these 
feelings. But to use this as a means to promoting active and rational 
benevolence is still a particular, though only a conditional, duty. It is 
called the duty of humanity (humanitas) because a human being is 
regarded here not merely as a rational being but also as an animal 
endowed with reason. (MS 6:457)
This passage raises a host of important questions. Why is there a duty 
to use sympathetic feelings to promote active and rational benevolence? 
What purpose do such feelings serve? How exactly are we to use our 
sympathetic feelings? Why does Kant refer to the duty to use them as 
the duty of humanity, and why is this only a conditional duty?
 To the question of the usefulness of sympathetic feelings for promot-
ing active and rational benevolence, an initially tempting answer is that 
such feelings play an important motivational role. It is all too common 
to lack the motivation to help others despite awareness that this is what 
duty requires. Some commentators interpret Kant as claiming that the 
value of sympathy consists in its ability to motivate us to fulfill our du-
ties when we are unmoved by representation of duty alone.3 Although 
the fully virtuous agent never needs sympathetic feelings in order to 
be motivated to obey the moral law, Kant certainly recognizes that each 
individual’s quest to become fully virtuous is an ongoing struggle (MS 
6:409, 6:446; Rel 6:47–49). Perhaps we have a duty to use sympathetic 
feelings as a means of promoting beneficence precisely because our ca-
pacity always to be sufficiently moved by recognition of duty is not yet 
fully developed.
 The motivational account is made tempting by remarks found in sev-
eral of Kant’s texts. For instance, after positing a duty to cultivate and 
use sympathetic feelings in section 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant 
remarks that “this [sharing painful feelings] is still one of the impulses 
that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty 
alone might not accomplish” (MS 6:457). It is not unreasonable to read 
this as a claim that we should cultivate our natural sympathy precisely 
because duty is not always a sufficient incentive. Moreover, the idea that 
sympathetic feelings have the positive effect of motivating beneficence 
when duty fails to is not unique to the Doctrine of Virtue. Kant makes 
similar remarks in “Observations of the Feeling of the Beautiful and 
Sublime” (Obs 2:218), “The End of All Things” (ED 8:337–38), and An-
thropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (A 7:253). In Anthropology, 
Kant writes, __s
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Nevertheless, the wisdom of nature has planted in us the predisposi-
tion to compassion in order to handle the reins provisionally, until 
reason has achieved the necessary strength; that is to say, for the 
purpose of enlivening us, nature has added the incentive of patho-
logical (sensible) impulse to the moral incentives for the good, as a 
temporary surrogate of reason. (A 7:253)
The fact that Kant reiterates this point about the positive motivational 
role played by sympathetic feelings in multiple works spanning three 
decades lends plausibility to the motivational account.
2.1 Autonomy and Impurity
Although it is sensible to infer from these passages that the duty to 
cultivate and use sympathetic feelings arises from our motivational 
needs, there are important objections to the motivational account. Marcia 
Baron persuasively argues that the motivational account is incompatible 
with Kant’s theory of freedom. The worry is that deliberately cultivat-
ing feelings and inclinations because one believes the objective law is 
an insufficient incentive seemingly amounts to a denial of autonomy. 
As Baron explains,
Once I regard the motive of duty as less than a fully sufficient incentive 
(or even as potentially sufficient, but as not fully compelling unless it 
coincides with my own interest or with some inclination), I call into 
question the supremacy of morality. Once I search for cooperating 
inclinations, I will scarcely be able to maintain the belief that moral 
considerations always trump any competing considerations. For in-
sofar as I adopt a policy of seeking assistance from the inclinations, 
I in effect allow that moral considerations are not fully compelling, 
motivationally; but if they are not fully compelling motivationally, 
presumably they are not fully compelling, period. I will end up asking 
myself, “It’s obligatory, and that carries some weight; but what other 
reasons are there for doing it?” (1995, 155)
 In addition to this point about autonomy, Baron (1995, 219) raises 
the further (somewhat related) worry that actively seeking out the as-
sistance of feelings and inclinations for the purpose of motivation is to 
advocate impurity of the will. In Religion, Kant remarks that impurity 
consists in an agent’s needing other incentives besides the law to fulfill 
her duties (Rel 6:30). Thus, it would seem that an agent who seeks to 
cultivate sympathy because she does not believe representation of duty 
will always be a sufficient incentive is moving away from virtue and in 
the direction of impurity. These points suggest that Kant should not be 
read as claiming we ought to cultivate sympathy because we need it for 
motivation to fulfill our duties.s__
n__
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 Although these worries are serious, there is an avenue of response 
available for proponents of the motivational account. There does indeed 
seem to be something problematic about an agent seeking nonrational 
sources of motivation to perform a required action at a particular time. 
But it is not as clear that there is anything wrong with cultivating 
feelings as a back-up motivation due to fear that there might be times 
in the future when recognition of duty will fail to motivate. To suspect 
that I might knowingly transgress the law at some future point in 
time need not undermine my belief that I am free. It could just be an 
acknowledgment that I am not fully virtuous and that I do not expect 
that to change anytime soon (though I shall continue to strive). Given 
that Kant is explicit that no one is fully virtuous (MS 6:409) and that 
no rational finite being attains moral perfection in this life (KpV 5:122), 
it is hard to see how we could rationally believe that duty will always 
move us. Further, it is somewhat misleading to describe an agent who 
cultivates feelings to compensate for moral deficiency as “advocating” 
impurity of will. When we try to make ourselves more sympathetic so 
that we will be less tempted by self-interested inclinations, we need 
not view ourselves as cultivating or championing impurity. A more 
charitable description is that we are conscientiously responding to the 
fact that we are already impure. Indeed, Kant’s discussion of impurity 
in Religion is not a warning about how we might end up, but rather a 
regretful description of our current state.
 It is open to Baron to respond to these points by suggesting that, 
given our inherent impurity, we must strive that much harder to make 
ourselves such that duty is always a sufficient incentive and that actively 
seeking out feelings as a source of moral motivation might undermine 
this striving. Still, in light of the preceding discussion, it is uncertain 
whether the motivational account fails for the reasons Baron offers.
2.2 Sympathy and Full Virtue
Even if cultivating feelings as a source of motivation is compatible with 
autonomy and striving for purity of will, there is another worry for the 
motivational account. The problem is that the view fails to explain why 
sympathy would be valuable even for an agent who is otherwise fully 
virtuous. If the value of sympathetic feelings consists solely in their abil-
ity to motivate agents who fail to be moved by representation of duty, 
then a fully virtuous individual would have no need for them. This is a 
counterintuitive result. Most of us share the intuition that sympathetic 
feelings would be valuable even for the morally strongest among us. This 
might not seem like a problem given that no human being is fully virtu-
ous. But even acknowledging this point, the motivational account has __s
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the counterintuitive implication that the greater one’s virtue, the less 
important it is for her to have a well-cultivated capacity for sympathy.
 Proponents of the motivational account may be unmoved by this 
worry because there is evidence that the fully virtuous Kantian agent 
would have no need for sympathetic feelings. Indeed, there are passages 
that suggest that Kant believes the virtuous agent would be better off 
without feelings and inclinations. A particularly noteworthy passage is 
found in the second Critique. In discussing the relative merit of actions 
performed from feelings rather than duty, Kant writes,
Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or not; and 
when morality is in question, reason must not play the part of mere 
guardian to inclination but, disregarding it altogether, must attend 
solely to its own interest as pure practical reason. Even this feeling 
of compassion and tender sympathy, if it precedes consideration of 
what is duty and becomes the determining ground, is itself burden-
some to right-thinking persons, brings their considered maxims into 
confusion, and produces the wish to be freed from them and subject 
to lawgiving reason alone. (KpV 5:118)
Though this passage might appear to indicate that Kant rejects the no-
tion that feelings have value even for virtuous agents, I do not believe 
this is the conclusion we should draw. The first thing to note about this 
passage is the phrase “when morality is in question” in the first sen-
tence. A few sentences prior to these remarks Kant stresses the contrast 
between legality and morality. By “legality,” Kant means permissibility. 
Thus, “morality” in this context does not refer to morally permissible 
actions but rather moral worth (that is, a unique type of moral value 
that merits esteem). In light of this, what Kant seems to be saying is 
that, if our actions are to have moral worth, duty must be the subjec-
tive determining ground. But this is not to say that we should never be 
moved by feelings of sympathy. While it is true that the virtuous agent 
possesses a good will that she demonstrates by fulfilling duties from 
the motive of duty, this does not mean that all of her conduct is done 
from duty; we do not maximize our virtue by maximizing the number 
of morally worthy actions we perform. Thus, the fact that actions from 
feeling lack moral worth does not suggest that the virtuous Kantian 
agent has no need for sympathy.
 What of Kant’s claim that sympathy “is itself burdensome to right-
thinking persons, brings their considered maxims into confusion, and 
produces the wish to be freed from them and subject to lawgiving reason 
alone”? Kant is certainly right that sympathy can be burdensome. For 
one thing, it leaves us vulnerable to pain and suffering that we would 
otherwise avoid. Moreover, sympathy can sometimes make it difficult to 
s__
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recognize our duty such as in situations in which people who stand in 
different relations to us have different types of needs. When deliberat-
ing in such cases, we may indeed wish to be rid of our feelings so that 
we could more easily recognize our duty and be confident that we are 
doing the right thing.
 Despite the fact that we sometimes wish to be rid of feelings and 
inclinations, Kant does not believe the fulfillment of such wishes would 
be a good thing. In Religion, he warns against trying to eliminate inclina-
tions: “Considered in themselves natural inclinations are good, i.e. not 
reprehensible, and to want to extirpate them would not only be futile 
but harmful and blameworthy as well; we must rather only curb them, 
so that they will not wear each other out but will instead be harmonized 
into a whole called happiness” (Rel 6:58). Moreover, as we have seen, 
Kant explicitly advocates the cultivation and utilization of sympathetic 
feelings in the Doctrine of Virtue (MS 6:457). These remarks tell against 
the suggestion that the ideal Kantian agent is altogether devoid of feel-
ings such as sympathy. In light of this point and the fact that common 
moral consciousness suggests that a virtuous agent should not be lacking 
in sympathy, it is worth considering alternative accounts of the Kantian 
value of sympathy that, unlike the motivational account, might be able 
to accommodate this idea.4
2.3 Motivation and Imperfect Duties
Before turning to alternative proposals, there is a variant of the moti-
vational account that merits our attention. Although Baron rejects the 
motivational account in its common guise, she advocates a variation of 
the view that could potentially explain why even the virtuous Kantian 
agent needs sympathy. Baron claims that, while sympathetic feelings 
should not play a motivational role in the fulfillment of perfect duties, 
they are necessary for motivating us to fulfill imperfect duties. Helping 
others is an imperfect duty because, although we are required to help, 
we are not required to try to help everyone who needs it at all times.5 
Baron believes that the nature of imperfect duties makes it impossible 
to fulfill them from duty alone: “Insofar as we are not required to help 
this person rather than that person, or on this occasion rather than 
another, my choice to help this person will be based on considerations 
other than, or in addition to, duty” (1995, 163). Thus, sympathetic feel-
ings play an important role for Kant because they prompt us to help 
others even when doing so is not strictly required.6 This could explain 
why even an otherwise fully virtuous agent would need a well-cultivated 
capacity for sympathy.
 The problem with this alternative version of the motivational account 
is that it is far from obvious that we are unable to fulfill imperfect duties 
__s
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from duty as primary motive. Baron provides an example of an agent 
who has an opportunity to help an elderly and ailing neighbor with her 
laundry (1995, 120). I believe that actions of this kind, though imperfect 
duties, can be done from the motive of duty. Consider Kant’s example 
from the Groundwork of a man who is cold and indifferent to the suf-
fering of others, yet has a high degree of reverence for the moral law (G 
4:398). Despite his lack of sympathy, this man could still be motivated to 
do his elderly neighbor’s laundry, even though he is not strictly required 
to do so. When the man sees his neighbor carrying her laundry, he real-
izes that it has been some time since he has fulfilled his imperfect duty 
to help others. Although he feels no sympathy for his neighbor and he 
knows that it would be permissible to skip this opportunity to help, he 
senses that he has skipped too many opportunities to help lately and 
that to skip this one too could potentially lead to an immoral habit of 
always putting off his imperfect duties. Thus, purely out of respect for 
the moral law, the man offers to assist his neighbor.
 I thus believe that the motivational account (in either of its guises) is 
a less than compelling explanation for the Kantian value of sympathy. 
What the account gets right is that sympathy often does motivate us 
when duty fails to and, all things considered, we should be glad that we 
are endowed with this motivational backup. But the suggestion that we 
should try to cultivate our capacity for sympathy because of our inher-
ent lack of moral strength remains controversial. Further, the view also 
suffers from the weakness of being unable to explain why sympathy 
would be valuable even for an otherwise fully virtuous agent. Insofar 
as this suggestion runs counter to widely shared judgments about the 
importance of sympathy, it is worth considering alternative accounts 
to see if they can render Kant’s ethics more compatible with common 
intuition without deviating from core Kantian doctrine.
3. the ePistemic AccouNt
Some commentators read Kant as claiming that the value of sympathy 
is epistemic. The idea is that sympathetic feelings are important because 
they alert agents to the suffering of others and help them see what type 
of support is needed. Unlike the motivational account, the epistemic ac-
count does not gain its plausibility from direct textual evidence. Kant 
never claims (at least not explicitly) that sympathetic feelings are a 
means of acquiring information. Rather, the epistemic account is an 
inference to the best explanation for why a philosopher who so often 
downplays the importance of sentiments—especially as a source of moral 
motivation—would posit a duty to cultivate and use sympathetic feelings. 
The suggestion offered by proponents of the epistemic account is that s__
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Kant sees these feelings as an effective means of acquiring practically 
useful information. As Nancy Sherman remarks, “If we have a practical 
interest in the moral law and its spheres of justice and virtue, we still 
require the pathological emotions to know when and where these ends 
are appropriate” (1990, 159).7 Importantly, the claim that sympathetic 
feelings are valuable for epistemic purposes does not in any way conflict 
with Kant’s vigorous rejection of sentimentalism.
 Not only does the epistemic account explain the Kantian value of 
sympathy in a way that is consistent with Kant’s rationalist account of 
moral motivation, the thought that sympathetic agents possess epistemic 
advantages vis-à-vis individuals lacking in fellow feeling is plausible in 
itself. Sympathetic agents are more likely to appreciate the emotional 
needs of others, and they also seem to recognize more of the morally 
salient features of a given situation. As Anne Margaret Baxley observes, 
the agent with properly cultivated sympathy “sees certain features and 
circumstances of the lives of others to which he might otherwise remain 
blind or ignorant. He sees, for instance, that people can be harmed in 
countless ways, large and small, often undeservedly, and in ways they 
cannot prevent or control” (2010, 165). The thought that sympathetic 
feelings are a useful source of information seems especially plausible 
when we consider cases in which another person is distressed by some 
event that would not cause similar pain if it happened to the agent in 
position to help. For instance, even if you are not the type of person who 
is upset by biting criticism of your work, if you have well-cultivated 
sympathetic feelings, you will likely recognize that your colleague needs 
emotional support when she receives harsh feedback.8
 These considerations illustrate the attractiveness of the epistemic 
account. But, to assess its merit properly, we must explore the specifics 
of the view. There are at least two different ways we might understand 
the proposal that the value of sympathetic feelings is epistemic. One 
possibility is that the feelings themselves are a type of perceptual ca-
pacity. The suggestion would be that the sympathetic feelings I have 
for an individual at a given time can alert me to the fact that he needs 
my help and also make me aware of how I can help. Though I believe 
this idea is implied in some of the discussions from proponents of the 
epistemic account, I do not believe it withstands critical scrutiny.
 While there does seem to be a correlation between experiencing sym-
pathetic feelings and recognizing the emotional pain of others, it would 
be a mistake to infer that these feelings are the cause of the recognition. 
It is much more plausible that we feel sympathy for others only after 
we become aware of their pain. The “perceptual faculty” version of the 
epistemic account implies that sympathetic feelings must somehow arise 
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in an agent prior to any cognitive awareness of that person’s pain. But 
it is hard to see how this might be true. How could I feel sympathy for 
a person in pain prior to coming to believe that she is in pain? Further, 
the notion that sympathetic feelings are a direct source of knowledge of 
how to help is also implausible. When we feel pain for others, we do not 
literally have the same experience they are having. I can certainly feel 
sympathy for a friend who is undergoing a painful divorce. But the pain 
I feel when I witness his distress does not by itself give me any special 
insight into the type of support needed by someone in his circumstances.
 In addition to these conceptual points, there is also textual evidence 
that Kant does not view sympathetic feelings as a faculty of perception. 
In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant defines the sympathetic feelings we have 
a duty to use as “sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasure (which are 
therefore to be called ‘aesthetic’) at another’s state of joy or pain (shared 
feeling, sympathetic feeling)” (MS 6:456). In an earlier discussion from 
the same text, Kant makes it clear that feelings of pleasure and displea-
sure should not be confused for a means of perceiving. Remarking on 
the susceptibility to feel pleasure from awareness that our actions are 
consistent with duty (which he calls “moral feeling”) Kant writes, “It is 
inappropriate to call this feeling a moral sense, for by the word ‘sense’ 
is usually understood a theoretical capacity for perception directed 
toward an object, whereas moral feeling (like pleasure and displeasure 
in general) is something merely subjective, which yields no cognition” 
(MS 6:400). Although the moral feeling Kant refers to here is something 
distinct from sympathy, we can assume that he would object to thinking 
of sympathetic feelings as a capacity for perception for the same reason 
(that is, that subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure do not yield 
cognition).
 Though these considerations undermine the plausibility of the 
“perceptual faculty” version of the epistemic account, there is a way of 
specifying the view so that it is not vulnerable to these worries. On this 
alternative formulation, sympathetic feelings provide practically use-
ful knowledge indirectly. The suggestion is that such feelings motivate 
us to engage in conversations with suffering individuals, and, through 
these conversations, we gain valuable insights about their experience. 
This not only facilitates beneficence toward the individual with whom 
we are presently conversing, but it also helps us more easily recognize 
the needs of others facing similar circumstances in the future.9
 While this suggestion is certainly reasonable, it runs into a famil-
iar problem. The idea that communicating with a suffering individual 
provides valuable knowledge about her experience that can be useful 
for helping her as well as others facing similar circumstances is highly 
s__
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plausible in itself. But in light of this point, we presumably have a 
duty to communicate with individuals who are suffering as a means of 
fulfilling our duties of beneficence. And insofar as we are obligated to 
communicate with those who are in pain so that we can help them, we 
should be able to fulfill this duty from the motive of duty—without the 
assistance of sympathetic feelings. If the suggestion is that we have a 
duty to cultivate sympathy because we need feelings to be motivated to 
take the necessary means to fulfill an objectively given end, the epistemic 
account runs into the same worries about impurity and autonomy that 
threaten to undermine the plausibility of the motivational account.
 Proponents of the indirect version of the epistemic account could 
appeal to the responses I suggested on behalf of the motivational ac-
count. Perhaps we have a duty to cultivate sympathetic feelings because, 
although we have a duty to communicate with those in need, we will 
sometimes lack the requisite moral strength due to our inherent impu-
rity. But the suggestion that Kant advocates cultivating feelings as a 
source of motivational backup remains highly controversial. Moreover, 
this indirect version of the epistemic account is also vulnerable to the 
second objection raised against the motivational account—that it fails 
to explain why sympathy is valuable even for fully virtuous agents. 
Virtuous agents would not need sympathetic feelings to motivate them 
to communicate with suffering individuals. They would be moved by 
awareness of their duty to help and the fact that communication is typi-
cally an important means to effective help. Thus, the indirect version of 
the epistemic account implies that the value of sympathy diminishes as 
an agent’s virtue increases. Insofar as we judge this to be an unwelcome 
implication, we have reason to search for an alternative explanation of 
the Kantian value of sympathy.
4. the PAtieNt-ceNtered AccouNt
4.1 The Duty of Humanity
We have seen that, when we begin our inquiry into the Kantian value of 
sympathetic feelings by asking why they are useful, two answers that 
immediately suggest themselves turn out to be problematic. Perhaps 
we can find a better answer if we turn to the question of why the duty 
to use sympathy is labeled the duty of humanity. Kant says the duty is 
given this name “because a human being is regarded here not merely 
as a rational being but also as an animal endowed with reason” (MS 
6:456). Unfortunately, he does not clarify his intended meaning in the 
rest of this section. However, I believe we can gain some insight if we 
focus on the contrast between mere rational beings and “animals en-
dowed with reason.”
__s
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 Kant often mentions our animal nature to highlight the moral hin-
drances generated by our sensible inclinations (Rel 6:26; MS 6:387). 
However, in the present context, I do not believe he is referring to the 
difficulties faced by moral agents, but rather the particular needs of 
moral patients. By referring to humans as animals endowed with reason, 
Kant is stressing the fact that human beings have an animal nature 
that gives rise to certain physical and emotional needs. Support for this 
reading is found in his discussion of the first duty of love (beneficence), 
located only a few pages prior to his discussion of the duty of human-
ity. Here Kant writes, “Consequently the maxim of common interest, of 
beneficence toward those in need, is a universal duty of human beings, 
just because they are to be considered fellow human beings, that is, 
rational beings with needs, united by nature in one dwelling place so 
that they can help one another” (MS 6:453; emphasis added).
 A particularly important human need is the need to receive genu-
ine expressions of sympathetic concern from others. Although the cold 
philanthropist of Groundwork I demonstrates a good will that is most 
estimable, if he truly does not feel any sympathy for others, many of his 
efforts at promoting happiness will be unsuccessful. This is especially 
true when those in need of help are friends and family members. When 
faced with difficult circumstances, we often need something beyond 
physical aid and financial support. We need the emotional consolation 
that comes from knowing that there are others disposed to share our 
pain. This need does not arise from our rational nature but rather from 
our human nature. My suggestion is that this is why using sympathetic 
feelings is labeled the duty of humanity. It is not a duty that all conceiv-
able rational beings have to each other. Rather, it is a duty that human 
beings have to one another due to contingent facts about human nature.
 I take it that the above claims about the general human need to receive 
sympathy are relatively uncontroversial. Still, some might be skeptical 
that Kant took this to be an essential human need. Fortunately, there is 
textual evidence that mitigates such skepticism. Consider, for instance, 
Kant’s discussion of the law of nature formula of the categorical impera-
tive in Groundwork II. To illustrate this formula, Kant considers four 
specific duties, including the duty to promote the happiness of others. 
What is noteworthy for present purposes is that, when Kant claims 
that an agent could not consistently will a principle of nonbeneficence, 
he does not mention the need for physical or financial assistance but 
rather the need for love and sympathy: “For, a will that decided this 
would conflict with itself, since many cases could occur in which one 
would need the love and sympathy of others and in which, by such a 
law of nature arisen from his own will, he would rob himself of all hope 
of the assistance he wishes for himself” (G 4:423). That Kant chooses 
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to mention sympathy rather than general beneficence is evidence that 
he appreciates the importance of sympathy for human well-being.10
 The strongest evidence that Kant recognizes the importance of receiv-
ing sympathy comes from section 35 of the Doctrine of Virtue. On the 
topic of the suffering of others he writes,
[I]t is a duty to sympathize actively in their fate; and to this end it 
is therefore an indirect duty to cultivate the compassionate natural 
(aesthetic) feelings in us, and to make use of them as so many means 
to sympathy based on moral principles and the feelings appropriate 
to them.
Further,
[f]or this [sharing painful feelings] is still one of the impulses that 
nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty 
alone might not accomplish” (MS 6:457).
 Though these remarks make it clear that Kant recognizes the impor-
tance of human emotional needs, interpretive questions arise here as 
well. For instance, what exactly is it that duty alone might not accomplish 
but the sharing of painful feelings would? As before, it is tempting to 
understand Kant to be saying that we sometimes need sympathy to be 
motivated to help others. But we have seen that this reading is problem-
atic. Thus, I do not believe Kant is claiming that we need sympathetic 
feelings to be motivated to try to help others. Rather, his point is that it 
is sometimes necessary that we be motivated by sympathetic feelings 
so that our attempt to help will be successful. Even if representation of 
duty alone is always a sufficient incentive to try to help, when duty is 
the sole incentive, this is often much less effective than help primarily 
motivated by sympathetic feelings. As Kant notes in the second Critique, 
though feelings and inclinations cannot be the sole ground of morally 
worthy conduct, they “can indeed greatly facilitate the effectiveness of 
moral maxims” (KpV 5:118; emphasis added and removed).11 Feelings 
make moral maxims more effective in part because human beings are 
constituted such that we sometimes need those around us to share our 
pain.
 To appreciate fully the motivation for the patient-centered account, it 
may help to consider an example. Suppose your neighbor is grieving the 
loss of her spouse following a tragic accident. You could certainly recog-
nize her distress and aim to alleviate her suffering without experiencing 
feelings of sympathy. Even if you are not saddened by her pain, duty can 
serve as your incentive as you visit her home to deliver a warm meal and 
express your condolences. Although your neighbor will appreciate your 
generosity and thoughtfulness, it will not be difficult for her to tell that 
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you lack the sympathetic feelings for her that others have expressed. 
This, of course, would not be problematic in itself because she does not 
need everyone around her to feel and express genuine sympathy. She 
might even have a special appreciation for your gesture precisely because 
you were moved to offer support from respect for the moral law. But 
imagine if everyone who sought to help her through the grieving process 
did so strictly from duty in the absence of genuine sympathetic feelings. 
This would presumably make it exponentially more difficult for her to 
recover because the feelings of loneliness and isolation that accompany 
severe grief would not be alleviated. Grief is an example of an emotional 
ailment that even an entire army of cold philanthropists—however good 
their wills—would be unable to assuage. This explains why sympathy is 
valuable even for agents who are otherwise fully virtuous—something 
that the motivational and epistemic accounts are unable to explain.
 One might object that the suggestion that we have a duty to cultivate 
and use sympathetic feelings to meet the emotional needs of others is 
vulnerable to the objection Baron raises against the motivational ac-
count—that it is incompatible with genuine autonomy and purity of 
will. After all, I have claimed that feelings are sometimes a necessary 
condition for successful moral action. In responding to this worry, it is 
important to note the reasons that feelings are deemed necessary on the 
respective accounts. On the motivational account, feelings are necessary 
because recognition of duty will not always be a strong enough incentive 
for the agent to try to help. In contrast, on the patient-centered account, 
recognition of duty is always a sufficient incentive to try to help—it is 
just that the absence of feelings will sometimes make this help less ef-
fective. Thus, our cultivation of sympathy as a source of motivation does 
not preclude our viewing ourselves as autonomous. Nor does it impede 
our striving for purity of will. On the contrary, we aim to cultivate sym-
pathetic feelings precisely because, given the needs of those around us, 
this is what the objective practical law commands.
 A second objection is that not everyone needs to receive sympathy in 
order to be happy. It is certainly possible that some people are constituted 
such that, given certain circumstances, they can experience complete 
satisfaction without ever being on the receiving end of genuine sym-
pathetic concern. However, the possibility of these rare cases could not 
undermine the patient-centered account because many duties take their 
form in light of general facts about the type of beings we are. And it is 
a general fact about human beings that we often need the sympathy of 
others. As Barbara Herman notes in discussing the claim that human 
beings need emotional intimacy, “That someone might choose a solitary 
life or live well without intimate connection to others no more under-
mines this fact about human beings than extreme physical stoicism or a 
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high pain threshold undermines the fact that physical assault interferes 
with successful human activity” (1993, 189n9).
 Of course, it would be far from ideal for an agent to be surrounded by 
people who will be moved to help her only when they experience sym-
pathetic feelings. Even the most kindhearted of agents will sometimes 
fail to feel the appropriate level of sympathy for a friend in distress. Our 
capacity to experience these feelings can easily be diminished by factors 
such as stress, exhaustion, illness, and so forth. Thus, we should hope 
that we have reliable friends who will be moved to help us from duty 
when their natural sympathy is lagging. But this does not undermine 
the claim that we need other people to be such that they are typically 
moved to help us from sympathetic feelings. It would be highly prob-
lematic from the standpoint of our well-being if those around us could 
only ever be moved to help us solely from respect for the moral law.12
4.2 Cultivation and Utilization
Two questions naturally arise at this point: (1) how does one cultivate 
sympathy? (2) how exactly are we supposed to use our sympathy? Kant 
provides a rough sketch of an answer to the first question. After claiming 
that we have a duty to cultivate and use sympathy he writes, “It is there-
fore a duty not to avoid places where the poor who lack the most basic 
necessities are to be found but rather to seek them out, and not to shun 
sickrooms or debtors’ prisons and so forth in order to avoid sharing painful 
feelings one may not be able to resist” (MS 6:457). The suggestion seems 
to be that we must resist the temptation to avoid situations that might 
arouse our sympathy. Presumably this is because consistently avoiding 
such situations could eventually lead to emotional atrophy. Putting oneself 
in these situations is, therefore, the first step of the cultivation process. 
Kant does not say much beyond this, but we can make reasonable conjec-
tures about what else is required for the cultivation of sympathy. Melissa 
Seymour Fahmy plausibly suggests that we must also seek to eradicate 
impediments to our natural receptivity to sympathy, including envy, 
resentment, indifference, and malice. This can be accomplished through 
practices of self-examination and self-reproach (Fahmy 2009, 38, 43).
 As for the second question, one obvious way in which we can use feel-
ings to help others is to verbally communicate our sympathetic concern. 
Simply telling another person that you share his pain can often go a 
long way toward easing it. Genuine sympathy can also be communicated 
in nonverbal ways. The look on a friend’s face and the warmth of his 
embrace are often every bit as revealing and comforting as the words 
that are spoken (Fahmy 2009, 43).
 The remaining interpretive question is why Kant calls the duty of 
humanity a conditional duty. I believe the best explanation is that we 
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can have a duty to utilize our sympathetic feelings only if we have them. 
Because it is not possible to have a duty to experience sympathetic 
feelings (G 4:400; MS 6:402), our duty is only to cultivate them and use 
them on the condition that we have them.13
 One might wonder how we can have a duty to use our sympathy rather 
than simply having a duty to cultivate it. It would seem that, if we have 
fulfilled our duty to cultivate sympathy, there would not be a further 
duty to express it because the feeling itself would naturally move us 
to do so. While this is often the case, there are circumstances in which 
we feel sympathy for someone without being immediately inclined to 
show it. An agent might be reluctant to express her sympathy because 
she is generally uncomfortable sharing her feelings and opening up to 
others. Or perhaps she knows that communicating her pain in a given 
situation will be emotionally taxing. The fact that we may feel anxious 
about expressing our emotions under difficult circumstances is what 
makes it possible for us to share our feelings from duty—something 
that might initially seem paradoxical.
4.3 Summary
In this section, I have presented the case for thinking that Kant’s duty 
of humanity is grounded in the fact that receiving sympathy from others 
is an important human need. The patient-centered account avoids the 
major worries that afflict the motivational and epistemic accounts. Not 
only is the patient-centered account free from tension with Kant’s claims 
about autonomy and purity of will, but it also explains why sympathy 
is valuable even for agents who are otherwise fully virtuous. That being 
said, it is important to note that the patient-centered account is com-
patible (in principle) with the motivational and epistemic accounts. It 
could be that the Kantian value of sympathy is threefold: to motivate 
beneficent actions, to prompt communication that leads to useful infor-
mation, and to directly relieve emotional suffering. At the very least, 
though, I hope to have shown that any account of Kantian sympathy 
that leaves out the third item on this list is incomplete.
5. morAl eNdowmeNts
In addition to avoiding problems faced by the alternative accounts, the 
patient-centered account has the further advantage of giving rise to a 
solution to an interpretive puzzle about the Doctrine of Virtue. In section 
XII of the Introduction, Kant discusses four moral endowments that are 
“subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty.” The four 
endowments are moral feeling, conscience, love of one’s neighbor, and 
respect for oneself (self-esteem). Kant claims that these endowments 
s__
n__
lc
HPQ 32_4 text.indd   368 7/8/15   1:54 PM
 RATIONAL BEINGS WITH EMOTIONAL NEEDS 369
are antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling and that it is in 
virtue of these feelings that human beings can be put under obligation 
(MS 6:399). The puzzle that arises is how feelings can be necessary for 
obligation, given that the essential feature of genuinely moral conduct 
is that it is performed independently of inclination.
 Kant’s subsequent discussion clarifies this issue for three of the four 
endowments. The explication of moral feeling and conscience is relatively 
straightforward. Kant tells us that moral feeling is the susceptibility 
to feel constraint from recognition of moral obligation (MS 6:399). This 
feeling does not precede consideration of duty but is rather a consequence 
of it. Conscience is the ability to arrive at a judgment about whether a 
possible action is permissible or impermissible (MS 6:400). The moral 
feeling is experienced after one’s conscience makes a judgment. In light of 
all this, it is obvious why the moral feeling and conscience are precondi-
tions for moral obligation. A being unable to assess the permissibility of 
an action and lacking the capacity to feel constrained by that judgment 
would not be a free moral agent.
 Respect for oneself (the third moral endowment) is a precondition of 
moral obligation because the moral law has its source within oneself. 
Thus, respecting the moral law is not possible in the absence of respect 
for oneself. If we did not respect ourselves, we could not respect the 
moral law, and we could not recognize duties. Importantly, we do not 
have a choice whether to respect ourselves; rather, the law within us 
unavoidably forces us to. When we violate duties to ourselves, this is not 
a result of lack of self-respect. Our conscience judges that such action 
is impermissible precisely because we necessarily have respect for our-
selves. Violations of duties to oneself result from ignoring the judgment 
of conscience, not a failure to recognize such duties.
 Unfortunately, Kant’s discussion of love of others in section XII is not 
as helpful in explaining why this moral endowment is a precondition for 
moral obligation. He notes that the feeling itself cannot be a duty but 
that benevolence is a duty (MS 6:402). He notes further that success-
ful completion of beneficent actions will result in experiencing feelings 
of love (MS 6:402). But none of this explains why the capacity for the 
feeling is a precondition for moral obligation. It seems obvious that we 
are capable of performing beneficent actions without having feelings for 
the person we are helping, and elsewhere Kant goes to great lengths to 
stress that moral worth is garnered precisely when feelings like love do 
not serve as an incentive to action.
 Paul Guyer attempts to solve this puzzle by arguing that Kant’s aim 
in this part of the Metaphysics of Morals is to offer an entirely empiri-
cal account of the etiology of moral action. Guyer interprets Kant as 
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claiming that love (as sympathetic feeling) is a precondition for being 
obligated to help others because such feelings are the “final impulses” 
prompting us to fulfill our duties to help others (2010, 151). In other 
words, sympathetic feelings are necessary to move us to perform benefi-
cent actions.14 An obvious concern about this interpretation is that, like 
the motivational account, it appears at odds with Kant’s claims about 
impurity and autonomy. Guyer avoids this worry because, on his view, 
feelings that play a causal role in the performance of moral actions are 
not to be thought of as causing the noumenal determination of the will 
but rather as the effects of that determination. They are not a safeguard 
in case the representation of duty fails to motivate us; rather, they are 
“the means through which the general representation of duty naturally 
and ordinarily works to move us to beneficent actions” (Guyer 2010, 147). 
On this interpretation, agents make the choice to obey the law (regarding 
beneficence) at the noumenal level, and sympathetic feelings are merely 
the phenomenal result of this choice. Thus, feelings are necessary in the 
sense that, without them, the noumenal determination of the will could 
not be manifested at the phenomenal level. This is apparently because 
of the empirical fact that human beings cannot be moved to fulfill duties 
of beneficence without sympathetic feelings.
 There are three distinct grounds for concern about Guyer’s interpre-
tation. The first is that there is little motivation for the empirical claim 
that we cannot be moved to help others from mere recognition of an 
obligation and a desire to act in accordance with our obligations. We do 
not need to feel displeasure when we see others suffering in order to be 
motivated to help them. Suppose one of your co-workers has earned a 
coveted promotion by lying and cheating. If you see this co-worker unable 
to start his car as you are leaving work late one night, it is unlikely that 
his suffering will cause you any displeasure. Yet you can still be moved 
to help him strictly because you recognize an obligation. Your decision to 
fulfill your obligation to help need not (and probably will not) manifest 
itself in the form of sympathetic feelings.
 Not only is there little reason to accept the empirical claim that we 
cannot be moved to fulfill our duties to help others without experiencing 
sympathetic feelings, but this claim also conflicts with some of Kant’s 
examples in the Groundwork such as the cold philanthropist in whom all 
feelings of sympathy have been extinguished due to grief and depression 
(G 4:398). Despite his lack of feeling, this individual is still moved to help 
others solely from respect for the moral law. Guyer acknowledges the 
tension between this example and his account of sympathy. He suggests 
that the cold philanthropist is not to be seen as an example of the way a 
person might actually be motivated; rather, he is simply an instructive 
thought-experiment that is meant to illustrate dutiful action. While 
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this is a possible way of understanding the example, doing so requires 
a complicated story about actual agents under similar circumstances. 
On Guyer’s account, an agent who has grown unsympathetic due to 
grief or depression can still be moved to help by duty at the noumenal 
level, but this will always manifest itself by his regaining sympathetic 
feelings as the final impulse to action at the phenomenal level. Kant’s 
view appears more plausible and is certainly less convoluted if we take 
the Groundwork example at face value.
 A second problem with Guyer’s account is that it is in tension with 
Kant’s discussion of love in section XII. Kant claims that, when we suc-
ceed in helping others, we eventually come to love the person we have 
helped:
So the saying “you ought to love your neighbor as yourself” does not 
mean that you ought immediately (first) to love him and (afterwards) 
by means of this love do good to him. It means, rather, do good to your 
fellow human beings, and your beneficence will produce love of them 
in you (as an aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general). 
(MS 6:402)
Here Kant is indicating that feelings of love toward a particular person 
are a consequence of dutiful beneficence toward that person. This is hard 
to reconcile with the claim that one must already feel love for a person 
to dutifully help that person.
 Guyer does not attempt to resolve this tension. Instead, he suggests 
that we set aside Kant’s discussion in the Introduction and turn to the 
discussion of sympathy as the third duty of love in sections 34 and 35. 
Guyer interprets Kant’s claim that sympathetic feelings are “impulses 
that nature has implanted in us to do what the representation of duty 
alone might not accomplish” (MS 6:457) as suggesting that these feel-
ings are “the proximate causes of beneficent actions, and thus are the 
penultimate stage in the phenomenal etiology of (these) particular moral 
actions” (Guyer 2010, 147). As mentioned above, Guyer believes that 
sympathetic feelings are not the cause of one’s choosing to fulfill her 
duty of beneficence but rather the means through which this noumenal 
commitment to duty is manifested in action at the phenomenal level. This 
leads to a third problem with Guyer’s account. If sympathetic feelings 
are the phenomenal effect of our noumenal commitment to duty, why do 
we have a duty to cultivate these feelings? It is clear that virtually all 
human beings have the bare capacity to feel sympathy. It would appear 
then that an agent who is much less sympathetic than most (while still 
having the minimal capacity for sympathy) but high in the other moral 
endowments (moral feeling, conscience, self-respect) will always be ca-
pable of being moved to help those in need because she will necessarily 
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come to feel sympathy as a result of the noumenal determination of her 
will. But if this is true, there is no reason for this agent to cultivate her 
sympathy—her time would be better spent continuing to cultivate her 
moral feeling, conscience, and self-respect.
 In light of these concerns about Guyer’s account, the puzzle about 
how the capacity to feel love can be a precondition to moral obligation 
remains. I believe the patient-centered account of the Kantian value of 
sympathy generates a solution to this puzzle. We begin with the fact 
that it is part of human nature to need emotional support from time to 
time. Because we need emotional support from others (this is one of the 
ways in which we make ourselves an end for others), we recognize an 
obligation to provide emotional support (because others’ ends become 
our ends through universal law). But it would not be possible to provide 
the emotional support needed in the absence of sympathetic feelings. We 
cannot be obligated to do things of which we are incapable. Thus, the 
capacity to feel sympathy is a necessary precondition for being under 
the obligation to provide emotional support for others, which is one of 
the most important duties of beneficence. The reason we have a duty to 
cultivate our sympathetic feelings is that the more often we experience 
them, the more frequently we will be able to successfully promote the 
happiness of others.
coNclusioN
In this paper, I have argued that traditional accounts of the Kantian 
value of sympathy are not entirely compelling. I have suggested an 
alternative account according to which the duty to cultivate and use 
sympathetic feelings is grounded in the fact that one of the most fun-
damental human needs is the need for emotional support in times of 
trouble. Three advantages of the patient-centered account have been 
outlined. The account (1) avoids tension with Kant’s views on autonomy 
and impurity, (2) explains why sympathy is valuable even for agents 
who are otherwise fully virtuous, and (3) generates a solution to an 
interpretive puzzle concerning the “moral endowments.”
 If our contingently given animal nature were such that our happiness 
never depended on receiving sympathy from others, it is doubtful that 
there would be a duty to cultivate and use our sympathetic feelings. 
Indeed, there might be other finite rational beings out there who can 
achieve all their moral aims without the employment of feelings. But, 
although the objective practical law applies to all rational beings as 
such, an agent’s specific moral obligations are determined in part by the 
circumstances she finds herself in. The condition we find ourselves in is 
one in which those around us are constituted such that they are vulner-
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able to emotional and psychological distress (in addition to physical and 
material ailments). The most effective way of alleviating the pains that 
run deepest is to share in them. This is why we have a duty to cultivate 
our capacity to feel genuine sympathy along with the resolve to utilize 
it when necessary.15
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NOTES
1. I use the following abbreviations for Kant’s works: MS = The Metaphys-
ics of Morals, KpV = Critique of Practical Reason, G = The Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Rel = Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, A 
= Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, ED = “The End of All Things,” 
and Obs = “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime.”
2. The two views I have described are not mutually exclusive. One might 
hold that the Kantian value of sympathy is motivational and epistemic.
3. Arguments in support of the motivational account can be found in Jensen 
1989, Allison 1990, Sherman 1990, Papish 2007, and De Lourdes Bourges 2012.
4. I am not suggesting that a successful account of the Kantian value of 
sympathy must fully agree with natural consciousness. The suggestion is rather 
that, other things being equal, an account that brings Kant’s ethics closer to 
common moral judgment is to be preferred over one that does not. And we must 
keep in mind that, in addition to being unable to explain why a virtuous agent 
would need sympathy, the motivational account is also threatened by Baron’s 
worries about autonomy and purity of will.
5. For extended treatment of perfect and imperfect duties and their rela-
tion to virtue, see Banham 2003, chap. 7.
6. See also Allison 1996, 121–23.
7. The epistemic account is also advanced in Herman 1985, Denis 2000, 
Baxley 2010, and Fahmy 2009. Fahmy also suggests a reading according to 
which there is a duty to express one’s sympathetic feelings, which implies 
that the value of these feelings transcends whatever epistemic role they play. 
Though I have reservations about Fahmy’s claims about the epistemic value of 
sympathy (for reasons I shall offer presently), many of her other suggestions 
are plausible and instructive. I incorporate and expound upon some of them in 
section 4 below.
8. A similar example is offered in Fahmy 2009, 41. __s
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9. Cf. ibid.
10. For extended treatment of the difference between the general duty of 
beneficence and duties of love and sympathy as outlined in the Metaphysics of 
Morals, see Fahmy 2010.
11. Though Kant adds to this that feelings such as sympathy cannot produce 
moral maxims, this is not in tension with my proposed reading of the Kantian 
value of sympathy. Though one of the advantages of the patient-centered account 
is its ability to explain why even a fully virtuous agent would need sympathy, 
the view does not imply that sympathy is a genuinely moral motive. The sugges-
tion is merely that we have a duty to cultivate and utilize sympathetic feelings 
because our fellow human beings often need to receive sympathy from us. This is 
consistent with denying that action from the motive of sympathy ever has proper 
moral worth (though conscientious cultivation of these feelings presumably does).
12. This thought underlies the objection that Kantian ethics is “alienating” 
and inimical to genuine friendship. For influential formulations of this objection, 
see Stocker 1976 and Annas 1984. Although much progress has been made in 
responding to this line of objection, the upshot of many discussions of this issue 
is that Kant’s ethics allows that actions done from sympathy as primary motive 
with duty regulating can be just as good as actions done from duty as primary 
motive. I believe the patient-centered account enables us to take the further 
step of explaining why it is preferable for agents to sometimes act from feel-
ings as primary motive. Being disposed to act from feelings on occasion is vital 
because this allows us to meet the needs of our fellow human beings. Further, 
the patient-centered account reveals that it is not just weak-willed individu-
als who have a duty to cultivate and use sympathy—even the most virtuous of 
agents have reasons to make themselves such that they are sometimes moved 
by sympathetic feelings. This constitutes further progress in blunting the force 
of the alienation worry. Though my proposal will not satisfy those who believe 
sympathy is valuable for its own sake, in explaining why even fully virtuous 
agents should be moved by sympathy on some occasions, the patient-centered 
account shows that Kantian ethics is closer to common moral consciousness 
than is often claimed.
13. An alternative reading is that we have a duty to use our sympathetic 
feelings only on the condition that the actions they prompt are morally permis-
sible. This reading is suggested by Guyer 2012, 424–25.
14. For an alternative proposal, see Geiger 2011. Geiger suggests that feel-
ings of love for others are necessary for perceiving their happiness as placing 
moral demands on us.
15. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2012 meeting of the 
North American Kant Society Pacific Study Group and the 2012 Rocky Mountain 
Ethics Congress. I thank audiences at those events for helpful feedback. I also 
thank Andrews Reath, Geraldine Ng, Mavis Biss, and two anonymous reviewers 
for useful suggestions. I am especially grateful to Nich Baima, Jeff Dauer, and 
Anne Margaret Baxley for many helpful and instructive conversations about 
these issues.
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